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Cloning and Arguing 
by 
The Reverend Stanley L. Jaki 
The author, a Hungarian-born priest of the Benedictine Order, is 
Distinguished University Professor at Seton Hall University. He has 
served as Gifford Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh and 
Fremantle Lecturer at Balliol College, Oxford. He ;s the recipient of 
the 1987 Templelon Prize. The/allowing was originally presented in 
Hungarian at the Christian Bioe/hies Conferem.:e in Budapest, June 2/, 
1997. 
General as surprise may be, it is not necessarily uniform. Every-
body was surprised, to say the least, when at the end of February, 1997, 
newspapers all over the world carried the photo of a sheep called Dolly_ 
Many biologists gave interviews, stressing their surprise, among them 
Lee Segal, professor of biology at Princeton. His surprise had, however, 
something special to it. Word about Dolly prompted him not to send to 
the publisher the manuscript of his new book on biology. The reason 
for thi s was that the manuscript contained his emphat ic assertion that 
the cloning of higher animals was impossible. 
Such, at least, was the account in The New York Times, which, as 
in many other cases too, was not ent irely correct. As I learned from 
Professor Segal's secretary, he referred only to a text still under rework-
ing. Regardless of this, there is no doubt that he voiced the conviction 
of the great majority of biologists about the impossibility of cloning 
higher animals, and certainly any individual of the species known as 
man. 
Biologists knew what they were saying. They had a long series of 
failures ever since 1938 when Hans Spemann proposed what he called 
a "fantastic experiment." The experiment, or cloning, seemed 10 belong 
to the world of fantasy. In 1952 an experiment using cells from 
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embryos of frogs failed almost at the start. In 1970 the same experiment 
succeeded only to the point of producing tadpoles. In 1981 two 
scientists claimed to have cloned a mouse, again using an embryo cell , 
but the next year two scientists reported that the experiment could not 
be duplicated. Several other scientists reported similar failures. 
The situation did not change essentially when in 1994 Neal First 
tried to clone calves from embryos but was unable to push the division 
of cells beyond 128. Two years later the division of cells was pushed 
incredibly further, as demonstrated by the photos of Dolly. 
Ian Wilmut, of the Rosslin Institute in Scotland, who produced 
Dolly, did so by taking a cell from the udder of an adult sheep, but 
unlike Dr. First, he put it into a donnant state, before transferring its 
nucleus into the egg cell of another sheep from which the nucleus had 
been removed. Wilmut's success had, however, been preceded by 277 
failures. 
Cause of Success Unknown 
Even now it is not fully known why Dr. Wilmut succeeded. 
Biologists believe that shortly after the fertilized ovum begins to 
differentiate into cells, most of its 100,000 genes shut off. Only those 
genes remain active that are needed to let the various cells perfonn their 
special function, that is, whether to produce hair, skin, bone, muscle, 
blood and so forth. 
It seems that by making a cell dormant, or almost inert, the mecha-
nism which turns off the activities of most genes in the cell is neutral-
ized. Such a cell is then placed into an unfertilized sheep egg cell from 
which its own genetic material has been removed. The fusion of the two 
cells makes the egg cell "think" that it has been fertilized. Then, so the 
theory goes, the chemical machinery of the egg cell activates the 
mammary cell genes into starting aJl over again, as if the two cells had 
been brought together for the first time as sperm and ovwn. So much 
about the fact of cloning not only some low-grade living organisms, but 
a mammaJ, an organism close to the organism known as man. 
This shows at least that in science it is very risky to claim that 
something is impossible. The history of science is full of refutation of 
such claims. Until Wohler produced synthetic urea in 1828, it had been 
generally believed that it was not possible to produce organic material 
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from inorganic. It is well to recall that the American astronomer 
Samuel Newcomb said aroWld 1895 that engine-powered flying was a 
physical impossibility. In 1934, Rutherford declared that talk about the 
industrial utilization of nuclear energy was moonshine. In 1950 
Vannevar Bush, the captain of American technology during World War 
1I, insisted that it was impossible to construct intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. 
But once Columbus crossed the Atlantic, many other ships 
followed. The cloning o f sheep will be followed by the cloning of other 
animals. There wi ll be many failures. Immediately after Dolly was 
unvei led, Dr. First at the University of Wisconsin attempted the 
cloning of a cow. The cloned cell died after it grew to 16 cells. It should 
have grown to 60-120 cells before it could have been transplanted into 
the uterus of another cow. Another biologist, Dr. Eyestone, produced 
embryos of cloned cows that survived)O to 40 days. Still others started 
experimenting with pigs, because pigs' organs seem to be particularly 
useful for transplants in hwnans. And two scientists in Oregon reported 
that they had successfully cloned rhesus monkeys, which of all animals 
are genetically the closest to man. 
In all these efforts much will be learned that will prove very useful 
in the eventual cloning of a hwnan. I feci it in my bones that the cloning 
of humans is already being attempted in various laboratories, even in 
countries where law forbids the cloning of man. And since there is no 
such law yet in the USA, biologists eager to be first with the cloning of 
man can take comfort from the fact that a new law is usually not 
retroactive. 
So the race is on, in line with a basic feature of the scientific 
enterpri se. Instead o f a feature I should perhaps speak. of a blot. The 
blot is the insatiable hunger for glory. In that respect scientists are c10sc 
second to politicians, those proverbial victims of the illusion that glory 
somehow makes one immortal. Had such a hunger for glory not been 
at play, there would not have been a breakneck race to be the first with 
the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA. Simultaneous 
discoveries, ever more frequent in sc ience, witness that hunger for a 
glory which goes only to the one who first crosses the finish line. 
Worse, the glory to be the first is often coupled with huge financial 
rewards. At any rate, ethical concerns hardly ever proved to be a barrier 
to slowing down research, let alo ne stopping it. Thus Oppenheimer 
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defended the making of the atom bomb with the following remark: "It 
is my judgment in these things that when you see something that is 
technicaJly sweet. you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to 
do about it only after you have had your technical success." John von 
Neumann was hardly an unethical man. Born and raised as a Catholic 
he died as a Catholic. But as a scientist he knew full well what may be 
best called the "technological imperative." He knew, to quote his 
words, that "technological possibilities are irresistible to man. If man 
can go to the moon, he will. Ifhe can control the climate, he will." 
And this is precisely what a historian of technology said with an 
eye on cloning. One may disagree with his generalization that the 
history of science is the story of the domination of science by technol-
ogy. But without doubt it has happened all too often that an available 
new technology has established " its own definitions and boundaries 
over settled human societies and ordered human perceptions." Another 
historian of science, Danicl Kevles, who at Caltech directs the Program 
of Science, Ethics and Public Policy, argued on behalf of cloning on a 
distinctly pragmatic basis, regardless of his having claimed the moral 
high ground: "As with so many previous advances in biology. today's 
aITront to the gods may be tomorrow's highly regarded- and highly 
demanded- agent of self-gratification or health ." 
But biotechnology is bound to develop far beyond the point of 
mere cloning where the DNA in the chromosomes is not touched at all. 
Beyond merely duplicating the chromosomes, there lies the prospect of 
altering the DNA and thereby altering the organism itself. On hearing 
about Wilmut's success, James Watson, the co-discoverer of the double 
helix structure of DNA, quipped that cloning could have already been 
done in 1938. He also referred to an article of his published in 1971 in 
Allantic Monthly. with the title, "Moving Toward the Clonal Man," in 
which he meant more than cloning. He meant that new age of abso lute 
biotechnology in which as he put it, two years ago in Princeton, only 
one kind of knowledge is necessary and useful , the science of genes. 
Watson is clearly looking forward to a future where the DNA of 
individuals would be manipulated and with even less moral concern 
than the concern sparked by the mere cloning of humans. His confi-
dence is certainly supported by the tenor of argwnents that followed the 
possibilities opened up with the presentation of Dolly. Too many of the 
sc ientists with expertise in cloning displayed indeed an alanning lack 
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of concern for considerations that are ethical in the sense of being more 
than mere pragmatic guidelines. 
They can take great comfort from the fact that no one would 
dispute the feasibility of cloning humans. No less comfort can they take 
from what is the gist of that document which is a most representative 
summary of the arguments for or against the cloning. The document is 
the I07-page-long final form of the Report which the 18-member 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission presented on June 14 to 
President Clinton, and it has a thrust that was aptly rendered in the 
remark, which Dr. Harold Shapiro, President of Princeton University 
and Chairman of the Commission, made on that occasion: "We all 
understand there are moral views that many of us have, which we do 
not want to translate into law out of respect for those who have totally 
different views. We are very sensitive to that issue." 
This amounted to a dichotomy between morality and legality, 
which deprived legality of being intrinsically ethical and debased 
morality to the level of sheer pragmatism. This is not to say that all 
members of the Commission were willing to countenance that 
dichotomy. Some, who were very much in the minority, kept emphasiz-
ing "the sanctity oflife and traditional human values," and insisted that 
cloning was radically different, say, from in vitro fertilization. Their 
view had to appear "extreme," if set ofT against the view of those who 
invoked this country's "strong tradition of not preventing scientific 
research and not intervening in people's right to reproduce." 
Majority Waffling 
The majority of the commission felt confident, however, that it was 
possible to stake out a "moral" ground between those two extremes. 
But their very central recommendation flew in the face of this conten-
tion of theirs. For they recommended nothing more than that the 
cloning of humans be prohibited by law, though only for three to five 
years, and this prohibition be extended only if a further review of the 
matter would vouch for such a step. Clearly, these middle-grounders 
had no genuine ethical objection to the eventual cloning of humans. 
Indeed they could not brand as unethical the action of those who, in 
spite ofa law, would go ahead with the cloning of humans. Convinced 
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as he was that there would be some such scientists, Dr. Shapiro could 
only brand their action as "unfortunate," but not "unethical." 
In fact, one member of the Commission, Dr. Bernard Lo, Director 
of the Program in Medical Ethics at the University of California at San 
Francisco, admitted that physicians working at I.V.F. (in vitro fertility) 
flatly ignored the Commission's invitation to discuss matters. They 
were not, of course, encumbered by problems of publicity and possible 
damage suits, unlike the biomedical industry that took up the invitation. 
It also turned out that the Commission itself began to move toward 
considering a legislative ban only after Laurie Flynn expressed her utter 
befuddlement with the arguments: " I have not really understood why 
we would want to, in my view, kind of fail the common man test." This 
was a reminder to the rest of the Commission that its function was not 
a purely academic exercise, but pan of the broader political process 
within which any common man counted as much as any single 
academic. The ethical perspective loomed menacingly large in the 
wings, but still could not be admitted to the stage where the arguments 
went back and forth . 
Very telling aspects of the true character of those arguments, 
especially the ones set forth by the middle-grounders became public 
when. a month or so earlier, preliminary conclusions of the Commis-
sion became public knowledge. Not once, however, was it disputed that 
the combination of money and scientific expertise can be used for doing 
the most repulsive things. Prof. First had such a combination in mind 
when he said in reference to a wealthy person who perhaps wanted to 
be cloned: "A private clinic could be set up and clone that person just 
as nice as could be. There are no rules or restrictions preventing it." 
Please, note that he found nothing repulsive in the combination of the 
desires of a wealthy man to duplicate himself and in the eagerness of 
the sc ientist to cooperate to perform that cloning. 
Those who know something about the dark side of human nature 
will not be shocked. The phrase, "nothing surprises me any more," has 
never been more appropriatc to use. But there is something even more 
shocking and in a sense surprising in the rest of Prof. First's comments. 
Prof. First. a member of the National Advisory Board on Ethics in 
Reproduction. reported that the Board found no merit in cloning for 
human society. The phrase " found no merit" is worth noting. It can 
have various meanings, such as undemonstrated. unjustified, useless, 
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trivial and so forth. But it never carries the meaning: it is repulsive, 
abhorrent, ethically wrong, let alone "gravely sinful." 
Belief in Revealed God 
In all the arguing that goes on about the cloning of humans, only 
those brand the cloning of humans as something abhorrent, repulsi ve, 
or gravely unethical, that is, sinful , who believe in a persona1 God. And 
not merely in a persona1 God, but in a God who revealed Himself. They 
are either Orthodox Jews, or non-liberal Christians, or Muslims. 
However, all these, when they participate in public arguments about the 
ethical nature of the cloning of humans, are not supposed to refer to 
their religious beliefs. 
To some extent this restriction is reasonable as the arguing about 
cloning humans takes place within a societal framework where many 
do not share religious views whatsoever. Even greater is the number of 
those who hold themselves religious without believing in some specific 
religious revelation. Examples are liberal Protestants and liberal Jews. 
Further, belief in religious revelation does not issue in a consensus 
about human nature. Orthodox Jews are hardly explicit about a human 
soul, which is the touchstone of truth for Catholics in arguing on purely 
rational grounds about the specific dignity of human nature. Traditional 
Protestants have kept thei r erstwhile diffidence about _philosophical 
arguments. Moreover, Catholics for the most part fail to note that those 
purely rational arguments, are, for all their validity, rather ineffective 
when severed from the great historical facts of Revelation. 
Those arguments are epistemological and metaphysical. They rest 
on considerations about language, symbol making, concept fonnation, 
about universals, about the reality of free will , about the sense of 
enduring self-identity, about consciousness, about existence statements, 
about search for explanation of what is specific in things, and ulti-
mately about their totality, the universe. Then there are ethical 
considerations, such as the sense of a distinction between what is 
morally good and what is evil , considerations about a need for ultimate 
justice, so conspicuously missing in this world of tragic inequalities and 
injustices . Only if man has an immortal soul , with eternal retribution 
for good or evil, can he look at the word justice as more than a mere 
word, good as long as one is not victimized. One can further point out 
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that without accepting a genuine uniqueness of man, it is not possible 
to defend democracy itself or to pass judgment on totalitarian regimes, 
including the Nazis and deplore, say the Holocaust as an unconditional, 
absolute moral evil. 
The reason for thi s lies with pragmatism, which remains the only 
recourse for those who have rejected traditional Western thought. Yet 
on the basis of pragmatism one cannot argue that the Nazi atrocities 
constituted an absolute moral crime against humanity. Nor does 
pragmatism provide a strict argument for condemning the extermina-
tion of six million kulaks and of another 14 million other victims of 
Stalin. Pragmatism has nothing convincing to offer in the way of 
condemning unconditionally the extermination of some 20 million, 
which Mao's Cultural Revolution found pragmatically necessary for its 
own purposes. Such and other relatively lesser crimes committed 
against humanity, say, by Pol Pot, Mobutu, and others can be con-
demned in a genuinely ethical tribunal only if there is a human nature, 
essentially different from mere animal nature. 
The foregoing arguments will not cut ice even with those who 
profess noble versions of pragmatism. Further, the thinking of more 
than half of the members of the Board appears to be dominated by a 
consideration that is nobly pragmatic only on the surface. Beneath that 
surface there lie various " religious" ideologies, such as secularism, 
scientific materialism, evolutionary wisdom, agnosticism and so forth. 
All these find a marvelous cover-up in pragmatism, for which ulti-
mately only success counts at a thorough disregard of genuinely ethical 
considerations. 
This was clear already when, prior to the problems raised by the 
possible cloning of humans, the Board had to advise the President and 
Congress on the fertilization of human eggs for the purposes of mere 
research. The Board did indeed advise that this should be done. One 
member of the Board, Ronald Green, professor of ethics at Dartmouth, 
said that this was one of the several "very thoughtful recommendations" 
made by the Board. Please, note the expression, "very thoughtful." It 
represents the same evasion as the phrase already quoted, "found no 
merit." 
Let me cite another phrase, equally evasive, by another member of 
the Board, R. Alta Charo, professor of law at the University of 
Wisconsin. She recalled that when the President and Congress roundly 
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rejected the suggestions of the Board that human embryos be produced 
for research, she learned a "valuable lesson." It taught her and other 
members of the Board that ethics is not plain logic. On the one hand, 
the Board "relied on logic to make its case that research with early 
human embryos was ethically acceptable." About that logic she said it 
was "airtight, but it did not change anybody's mind and there was a lot 
of resentment." On the other hand, she and others realized that " logical 
arguments are only rationalizations for gut feelings or religious 
viewpoints." Then she concluded: "I don't think we can make good 
suggestions unless we can understand what is compelling for the 
public." 
The phrase "compelling for the public" is another illustration of the 
verbal technique for evading truth, ethical truth. Modern society. or the 
public, is ever more ready to modify what it finds compelling to oppose 
or not to oppose. Fifty years ago modern society found it compelling to 
reject abortion as unethical . Today at least half of Western society finds 
it compelling to approve abortion, another fourth of that society finds 
it compelling to compromise, and no more than a fourth, if that many 
at all, would find it compelling to reject abortion as something 
intrinsically Wlethical. Therefore as long as society finds it compelling 
to approve of abortion it has no logical grounds to oppose the produc· 
tion ofhwnan embryos for experimentation. Prof. Charo was therefore 
logical, but not entirely. She failed to see that there can be much logic 
in at least some of those "gut feelings and religious viewpoints." Those 
who claim dignity only when it suits them, fail to see logic in the 
arguments against the cloning of humans. 
Recommendations of the Board 
For when no logic is seen in "gut feelings and religious view· 
points," the door opens wide to a purely pragmatic approach, such as 
the Board's final recommendation of a temporary moratorium. In other 
words, attention was focused on the fact that in Wilmut's case one 
successful healthy clone implied several dozen sheep fetuses with 
severe malfunctions. The moratorium on cloning humans was to last 
until the technology of cloning developed to the point where hardly a 
single human fetus with severe malfunctions would be produced by 
cloning. 
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Within five years, so went the final recommendation of the Board, 
public revulsion would abate and the pragmatic success of cloning 
would make compelling the cloning of humans. Such an argumentation 
means that the ethical merit of cloning humans is merely the function 
of the measure of technological success, or perhaps of the effectiveness 
of molding public opinion by holding high that success. Such a 
brainwashing can easily be accomplished in a society which puts so 
high a premium on success of any kind. This worship of success is not 
absent in the Christian, and not even in the Catholic, segment of 
society. 
Members of the Board admitted that cloning in private clinics not 
subsidized by Federal money could be stopped onJy by a Federal law. 
But even if such a law were enacted, it should be abrogated, they said, 
once the technology of cloning became a safe procedure. One member 
of the committee, Dr. Bernard Lo, admitted that "there is no easy way 
to dismiss the religious, almost mythical argument that it [the cloning 
of humans] was deeply objectionable, an affront to human dignity." 
This could be true only if Dr. Lo and the great majority of the Board 
had a non-easy, that is, hard or difficult or complex way to dismiss that 
argument. But what was that difficult way of arguing? It consisted in a 
grim resolve to fall back on pragmatism. But a grim resolve is not an 
argument, let alone a hard-won argument. Instead of demonstrating that 
there was no "compelling reason" why cloning should be banned, Dr. 
Lo merely reaffinned that was no such reason. 
Other members of the Board interviewed in The New York Times 
were even more open in saying that the ethical issue about cloning 
ceased in the measure in which the science of cloning was perfected. 
Thus Dr. Retaugh Graves Dumas, vice provost for health affairs at the 
University of Michigan, put forward the following " moral argument" 
on behalf of cloning: " It is immoral not to have access to the best 
technology we could muster. It would be a shame to prohibit cloning 
forever." In other words, pragmatism makes it possible to reverse 
totally the role of those who should feel ashamed and those who should 
not. And why? Because there are no "compelling arguments." 
The phrase "compelling arguments" is simply a device to avoid the 
task of arguing in all earnestness. But it also shows that arguments are 
much more than sheer logic. Logic, which is about various degrees of 
identity relations among concepts, cannot even assure man that there is 
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plain external reality in front of him. For the phrase," I know that a 
table is there", does not establish a logical identity between the mind 
and the table. Yet the assertion of the reality of the table remains fully 
rational. 
Nothing of such elementary facets of the mind in face with reality 
are in view in the argumentation of those who will be mostly listened 
to by the political authorities who must decide whether to make or not 
to make it a legal offense to clone humans. Those authorities. I mean 
the legislators and other elected officials, are a representative cross-
section of society. And since much of society's thinking is pragmatic, 
society and its elected representatives will follow the line of pragma-
tism, which is to gratify self-satisfaction and mere bodily health. 
Legal Taken for Ethical 
Society now largely takes the view that what is legal is also ethical. 
And ultimately what is legal is decided by the Courts. Now to speak of 
the USA alone, there the Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that patenting 
genetically created life was legal . Therefore, long before cloning had 
become an ethical issue for scientific technology, the Court made a 
ruling which implied that cloning, too, would be considered legal and 
therefore ethical. 
The cloning of humans can and will become legal, but unless 
morality is equal to legality, it will not become ethical. For unless there 
is in man more than matter, there is no valid ethics, but only rules of 
convenience. If the Vatican declared, already in 1984, the cloning of 
humans to be gravely unethical , it is only because Rome stands for that 
Christian view that man has a soul that no scalpel or microtome can 
touch. 
Indeed, in that view even a cloned human being will have a soul. 
Outwardly that being may not be more than an identical twin, but it has 
an individual soul different from the soul of the other twin. Therefore 
such a cloned human being should be treated by society in a truly 
human way. But the question is whether by the time-perhaps within 
another generation- there are cloned humans ready to go to school in 
significant numbers, society sti ll will be sufficiently human. For if the 
present is already very chaotic from the ethical viewpoint, incredibly 
more chaotic will be that not too distant future where thejuggemaut of 
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biotechnology will be roaming freely. "Nothing suggests," that 
historian of technology said, .. that the President or Congress has the 
power-<>r ultimately the will- to defy that relentless juggernaut. It 
will be a chaotic future. Better get used to it." 
It is certain that mere pragmatism is not a preparation for getting 
used to that future. Pragmatism has no compelling reasons except to be 
pragmatic about reasoning. For compelling reasons we must tum else-
where, indeed to the very source that created in the Western world a 
consensus about compelling reasons, a consensus which has for some 
time been eroding and whose last pillars are now being disassembled 
by the latest versions of the oracles of Delphi. I mean the new breed of 
academics, ca1led ethicists, with high visibility in universities, medical 
schools and hospitals. Like the oracles of Delphi, they are past masters 
in evasiveness. 
We have come a long way from that supreme Master of ethics, who 
once warned: "Let your yes be yes and your no be no." But Jesus is to 
be recalled for another reason as well, which is implied in my repeated 
references to "compelling reasons." For in his dramatic account of the 
banquet in the Kingdom of God, to which the invited refuse to come, 
he says that all those who are found in the highways and along the 
hedgerows must be compelled to come in (Lk 15:23). 
This compulsion is simply evangelization. It has been done mainly 
by virtue of its being intrinsically compelling, though because of 
historical circumstances it also took the form of external compulsion. 
Messengers of evangelization can only rejoice that long gone are the 
times when people could be driven to the baptismal font. But 
evangelization as a relentless presentation of compelling reasons will 
go on. For there will always be such who hear in their soul the echo of 
Paul's words: "Woe to me, if I do not evangelize." 
Would that such souls were very numerous and properly intelligent 
whenever they have to descend into the arena of mere reason . There 
they cannot refer to some facts of hi story, which, like facts in general, 
have a greater persuasiveness than abstract reasoning, however valid. 
They must articulate those arguments with consummate philosophical 
skill. This demands far more than a recourse to some choice phrase, 
such as Flynn's reference to "the common man test." But in articulating 
those arguments they must not forget that the strength which they see 
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in them derives from their own openness to certain facts of history, 
salvation history, that is. 
They cannot assume this strength to operate in their opponents in 
the cloning debate. Actually, a very different strength is at work in their 
opponents in the cloning debate as they present their own arguments. 
They are evangelizers in their own way, though very careful not to 
make it appear so. Here, too, they resort to words artfully left in 
vagueness. A case in point is the letter which the Commission sent to 
the President together with the Report. There, a covert appeal was made 
to a need for evangelization, though under the cover of further need for 
education, the specifics of which anyone could interpret according to 
his or her ideology. According to the letter, the members of the 
Commission "feel quite strongly that most of the legal and moral issues 
raised can only be resolved, even temporarily, by a great deal more 
widespread deliberation and education." 
Rightly so. The question is, what kind of education should prevail? 
There is an education steeped in genuine Chri stian faith, which, let it 
be recalled ought to be always supported with fully rational argument. 
Did not Saint Paul warn in Romans (12:1) that Christian faith should 
be a rational service? Then there is an education within which phrases, 
such as President Clinton's affinnation of "the miracle of human life 
and the God-given individuality of each person", become hollow in the 
measure in which the credibility of those voicing such phrases is no 
longer marketable. And there is an education by militant secular 
humanism, viewing gleefully the juggernaut of biotechnology. The 
crudely pragmatic future it wants to bring about will be contained only 
in the measure in which men and women are exposed to compelling 
reasons about Jesus Christ. Public arguments about cloning are already 
sidetracked into the blind alley of pragmatism. The only hope lies with 
a re-evangelization of Christians, and especially of Catholics, with the 
help of a catechism that will not ask them to reinvent eternal truths. 
These truths, revealed truths, cannot readily penetrate adult minds 
that prefer arguments to the love of truth, in order to evade Truth writ 
large. Those truths have been available now for many generations in 
forms that can readily be put even in the mouths of babes. They, by 
nature, know that unless one becomes as receptive as a child, one shall 
not enter the Kingdom of God. This kingdom is the only alternative to 
the kingdom of academic and societal sophistication where "compelling 
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reasons" mean a heavy reliance on conveniently glib phrases that most 
do not dare to probe into. They don't dare because their conviction 
largely consists in the conviction that one need not be convinced about 
anything. 
The cloning of humans will come, it may already be under way, 
and will go on. Arguments in support of cloning need not be strong as 
long as they are supported by a strong downward stream towards 
societal lowlands where pennissiveness is the sole ethical nOnTI. 
Arguments against cloning need not be directed at the champions of 
cloning, not even at the many muddle-headed middle-grounders, who 
often remind one of goats put in charge of the cabbage field. Arguments 
against cloning should benefit only those, who mostly because of their 
faith in higher realities, would recoil at the prospect of failing the test 
of the common man, who is the only everlasting man that cannot be 
cloned but only created. Their recoil or rather revulsion becomes truly 
human only when fully rational too, that is, fully equipped with the art 
of arguing. 
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